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Preventive War, Deterrent Retaliation, and
Retrospective Disproportionality
Brian Angelo Lee∗
ABSTRACT: The legal and moral (“just war”) permissibility of
preventive military attacks has been one of the most urgent questions
in international law since the onset of the War on Terror. Debates in
this area commonly rest upon an assumption that the relevant
strategic choice is between preventive war and deterrence, and that
even if preventive war may be controversial, deterrence at least is
legally straightforward and relatively unproblematic. This Article
challenges that conventional assumption. I argue that deterrence and
preventive war have more in common than is typically noticed—
specifically, a shared future-orientation and reliance on retrospectively disproportionate violence—and that in virtue of these common
features, much of what we say about the permissibility of one of
these strategies we shall have to say also about the other, both under
international law as manifested in the United Nations system and
under contemporary “just war” arguments. Contrary to common
assumption, deterrence offers no easy escape from the legal and
moral concerns raised by preventive war.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on
New York and Washington, D.C., President George W. Bush
declared that henceforth the United States would consider
preventive war to be among its options for addressing threats posed
by hostile regimes abroad.1 This declaration, formalized in the 2002
National Security Strategy document, bore practical fruit in the 2003
United States-led invasion of Iraq and continues to shape current
debates over the proper way to respond to the threat of global
terrorism and seemingly “rogue” regimes, such as in North Korea
and Iran.2
This embrace of preventive war has been highly controversial.
Defenders of the policy assert that preventive war is sometimes
necessary in an era of rogue states, weapons of mass destruction
1. President George W. Bush, Commencement Address at the United States Military
Academy in West Point, New York, 1 PUB. PAPERS 917 (June 1, 2002) [hereinafter West
Point Speech].
2. THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 13–16
(Sept. 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf [hereinafter NATIONAL
SECURITY STRATEGY].
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(WMD), and terrorist organizations capable of attacks anywhere in
the world.3 Critics of the policy decry the fact that preventive war
involves the use of military force to thwart an attack that has not yet
occurred and perhaps never will occur. These critics consider such a
policy to be both incompatible with international law norms and a
reckless abandonment of the global security system that has been
constructed at enormous human cost out of the previous centuries’
wars.4
It is common to frame this debate as a choice between two
alternatives: either preventive war or deterrence (and strategies such
as containment and power-balancing that rely upon deterrence).5 It
is also common to assume that, however controversial preventive
war’s legal and moral permissibility may be, deterrence is clearly less
problematic than preventive war.6
This Article challenges that fundamental assumption. I argue that
preventive war and general deterrence share certain fundamental
features and that, by virtue of this similarity, much of what one says
about the legal and moral permissibility of preventive war one shall
also need to say about deterrence and related approaches. Deterrence
3. See, e.g., West Point Speech, supra note 1, at 919 (“For much of the last century,
America’s defense relied on the Cold War doctrines of deterrence and containment. In some
cases, those strategies still apply. But new threats also require new thinking. Deterrence—the
promise of massive retaliation against nations—means nothing against shadowy terrorist
networks with no nation or citizens to defend. Containment is not possible when unbalanced
dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly
provide them to terrorist allies.”); John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 749–50
(2004) (“A second reason to modify the use-of-force rules is that they do not address the
recent changes in technology and political organization that pose threats to nations. The easier
availability of weapons technology, the emergence of rogue states, and the rise of international
terrorism have presented more immediate threats to national security than those from attack by
other nation-states.”).
4. See, e.g., Neta C. Crawford, The Slippery Slope to Preventive War, 17 ETHICS &
INT’L AFF. 30 (2003); Jordy Rocheleau, Preventive War and Lawful Constraints on the Use of
Force: An Argument Against International Vigilantism, in RETHINKING THE JUST WAR
TRADITION 183, 202 (Michael W. Brough et al. eds., 2007) (“Few deaths in history can be
traced to a failure to wage preventive war, whereas preventive wars themselves have taken
countless lives. Although some fear the consequences of deference to international authority,
the greatest danger to peace and justice today lies in the too-ready abandonment of law.”).
5. See, e.g., Editorial, In Defense of Deterrence, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2002, at A24
(arguing against discarding deterrence from America’s strategic arsenal in the wake of the
September 11 terrorist attacks); Samantha Power, Our War on Terror, N.Y. TIMES, July 29,
2007, at 1, 8–10 (book review) (assessing options for addressing the threat of terrorism). See
generally IAN SHAPIRO, CONTAINMENT: REBUILDING A STRATEGY AGAINST GLOBAL TERROR
passim (2007).
6. See, e.g., commentators discussed infra Part II.E.
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thus offers no easy escape from the legal and moral concerns raised
by preventive war.
The implications of this conclusion are broad, since deterrence is
an essential part of national security strategy in general, both on its
own and as a fundamental element in strategies of containment and
power-balancing:
[I]t should now be apparent that deterrence is not going to
disappear just because the Cold War is gone. It is the underlying
basis of most prospective or plausible regimes for the management
of regional or global security. . . . It is not simply a way of trying to
force others to behave; it is woven into many elements of foreign
and national security policy. For instance, deterrence in place
remains a political prerequisite for cooperation with adversaries or
potential adversaries—for making meaningful and risky concessions,
pursuing “engagement,” and reaching many types of
agreements. . . . And if we are to build successful international
communities, general deterrence will play a role comparable to
police protection in fostering democratic society.7

Thus, an accurate assessment of the relative legal and moral statuses
of deterrence and preventive war is essential.
Part II of this Article develops the claim that general deterrence
and preventive war have fundamental similarities that make key
concerns about preventive war equally applicable to deterrence and
introduces the resulting problem for claims that deterrence as a
general security strategy is necessarily legally or morally superior to a
strategy that includes possible recourse to preventive war. Part III
examines in more detail how these fundamental similarities affect the
respective statuses of deterrence and preventive war under current
international law as embodied in the United Nations system. Part IV
focuses on contemporary “just war” arguments against preventive
war and concludes that those criticisms either apply equally to
deterrence or are unpersuasive. Thus, neither under the international
law of the United Nations system nor under contemporary “just
war” analyses does deterrence offer a refuge from the legal and moral
concerns raised by preventive war. Part V concludes the discussion.
7. PATRICK M. MORGAN, DETERRENCE NOW, xix (2003) (emphasis omitted); see also
LAWRENCE FREEDMAN, DETERRENCE 11, 41 (2004) (noting that “containment as an
objective lent itself to deterrence as a method” and referring to general deterrence “in the
guise of a balance of power”); MORGAN, supra at 87–89 (noting the role of deterrence in
balance-of-power systems).
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One note about scope: This Article’s discussion will focus
exclusively on legal and moral (“just war”) issues raised by
deterrence and preventive war. Deterrence and preventive war
obviously have substantial practical differences in their day-to-day
operation, and there may be compelling prudential reasons to prefer
one over the other in individual cases or even universally. However,
although those practical differences are important, and although
legal and moral considerations can themselves have significant
prudential implications, whether deterrence or preventive war
ultimately makes for a more effective foreign policy is a question of
statecraft that lies largely outside the scope of this Article. The
questions at issue here will be legal and moral.
II. FUNDAMENTAL SIMILARITIES BETWEEN DETERRENCE AND
PREVENTIVE WAR
A. Preview
What are these fundamental similarities between deterrence and
preventive war? This Part discusses those similarities in detail, but a
brief preview of the course of that discussion may be helpful. I argue
first that both deterrence and preventive war share a fundamental
future orientation—that is, they both focus primarily on averting
future attacks rather than on responding to ongoing or past attacks.
Moreover, as a result, both deterrence and preventive war necessarily
rely upon retrospectively disproportionate violence. Preventive war
does so by attacking an adversary who has made no prior attack;
deterrence does so by responding to an adversary’s attacks with a
level of retaliation that deliberately and substantially exceeds the size
of the provocative attack. Since a proportionality requirement is a
basic element of standard frameworks for regulating the use of force,
this shared reliance on retrospectively disproportionate use of force
raises serious questions about the extent to which deterrence really is
less problematic than preventive war.
B. Preliminaries
Some definitions and distinctions will prove useful in our
analysis. First, both “preventive war” and “preemption” are forms of
“anticipatory self-defense”—uses of force motivated by the
expectation or concern that the target regime will, in the future,
perform an aggressive act in response to which the anticipating party
257
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would be entitled to defend itself, even though at present the target
has not yet performed that aggressive act. Exactly how and where to
draw the line between preemptive and preventive forms of
anticipatory self-defense is uncertain and somewhat controversial,8
but the basic distinction is straightforward—the sooner or more
certain the feared aggressive act is, the more the anticipatory
response is “preemptive;” the more distant or uncertain the threat,
the more the anticipatory response is “preventive.”9
There are many definitions of deterrence, most fairly similar.
Lawrence Freedman’s is sufficient for our purposes: “[D]eterrence is
concerned with deliberate attempts to manipulate the behavior of
others through conditional threats.”10 Patrick Morgan usefully
distinguishes between immediate and general deterrence:11
An immediate deterrence situation is one in which an actor realizes
that another specific actor is seriously contemplating attacking and
undertakes to deter that attack. . . . General deterrence has to do
with anticipating possible or potential threats, often hypothetical
and from an unspecified attacker, and adopting a posture designed
to deter other actors from ever beginning to think about launching
an attack and becoming the “potential” or “would-be” challengers
so prominent in deterrence theory.12

8. See, e.g., David Luban, Preventive War, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 207, 230 (2004)
(advocating changing the definition of preventive war by replacing a temporal-imminence
requirement with a probabilistic requirement).
9. For sheer vividness in characterizing situations of preemption, one would be hardpressed to improve upon a starship captain in an old TV show: “The trigger’s been pulled.
We’ve got to get there before the hammer falls.” Star Trek: Errand of Mercy (NBC television
broadcast Mar. 23, 1967), available at http://www.cbs.com/classics/star_trek/ (follow
Season 1 hyperlink, go to Episode 26). (The strategic situation in that episode was, regrettably,
described with insufficient detail for thorough analysis. Captain Kirk’s remark notwithstanding,
the Enterprise’s actions may not have been strictly preemptive.) Note that although the 2002
National Security Strategy document speaks in terms of “preemption,” the sorts of actions that
it describes would more typically be called “prevention.” See NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY,
supra note 2, at 13–16. In this Article, I shall follow common practice in using “prevention”
to describe such actions.
10. FREEDMAN, supra note 7, at 6.
11. Because our discussion will focus almost exclusively on general deterrence, in the
interest of economy I will routinely use the unmodified term “deterrence” to refer to general
deterrence. If I intend a specific point to be about immediate deterrence, I will indicate that
explicitly.
12. MORGAN, supra note 7, at xvi.
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C. Future orientation

The distinctive difference between preventive war and more
familiar defensive uses of force is that the latter address an ongoing
act of aggression, while the former aims at forestalling aggression
that will occur only in the future (if at all). Fighting the German
army north of Paris in 1940 was garden-variety defense; fighting the
German army in the Rhineland in 1936 to impede Nazi Germany’s
remilitarization and discourage Hitler’s expansionist ambitions
would have been preventive war.
However, this future orientation is not unique to preventive war;
it is an essential feature of deterrence as well.13 Both preventive war
and deterrence fundamentally seek to achieve successful long-term
defense by shaping the future actions of potential adversaries,
including actions that might not occur for many years into the
future. In terms of goals, the distinction between the two approaches
is not sharp and can easily become quite blurry. Patrick Morgan
noted that deterrence theory’s central aim was to prevent an
adversary from launching an attack,14 while an anonymous Bush
Administration official remarked that one effect of declaring a

13. Jeff McMahan would press the connection even further, asserting that:
[T]here is a clear sense in which all defen[s]e is preventive. One can defend oneself
only against future harm. . . . One can, of course, defend oneself against the
continuation of harm that is being caused by an attack in progress, but it is still only
harm that one will otherwise suffer that one can defend oneself against. . . . It
seems, indeed, a conceptual truth that successful defen[s]e consists in preventing
harm from occurring.
Jeff McMahan, Preventive War and the Killing of the Innocent, in THE ETHICS OF WAR:
SHARED PROBLEMS IN DIFFERENT TRADITIONS 169, 172 (Richard Sorabji & David Rodin
eds., 2006). Although McMahan’s claim may be true in some narrow sense of “future,” that
sense seems inappropriate to this debate. Even though military clashes extend through time,
and thus some parts of a clash may be in the future relative to other parts of the same clash,
when we reason about the justice and legality of the act of resorting to force at all—for
example, address issues of jus ad bellum rather than jus in bello—we treat the resulting clash as
a single complex entity, and measure past and future relative to it. The distinction between
actions occurring within an ongoing conflict and actions that initiate a conflict is essential and
longstanding, and not to be abandoned lightly. To be sure, determining the beginnings and
ends of conflicts is notoriously often quite difficult, and important theoretical issues may arise
from such puzzles. But for the issues at stake in this discussion, such metaphysical subtleties are
a distraction.
14. MORGAN, supra note 7, at 13.
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willingness to wage preventive war would be to produce “a deterrent
element for the bad guys.”15
D. Shared Dependence on Violence
Deterrence and preventive war share another fundamental
similarity: Both depend upon violence for the attainment of their
prospective aims. Although preventive war’s reliance on violence is
obvious, the way in which deterrence relies on violence can easily go
unnoticed, since successful deterrence is “marked by nothing much
happening.”16 Moreover, the history of deterrence theory offers an
additional reason why the role of violence in deterrence has been
easy to overlook. Modern deterrence theory developed largely
during the Cold War, in a strategic environment dominated by the
presence of nuclear weapons.17 The apocalyptic destructive power of
nuclear weapons had two relevant consequences. First, it made
serious consideration of retaliation seem rather pointless—if nuclear
deterrence failed, the potential retaliator was probably doomed
anyway.18 In this respect, nuclear deterrence was a one-time-only
tactic, albeit one that extended over several decades. Second, nuclear
weapons’ overwhelming destructiveness offered a way to avoid
credibility concerns. The weapons were so destructive that even a
threat with relatively low credibility might still be enough to deter,
since the consequences of guessing incorrectly were so dire as to
make even minimally credible threats become frightening.19
15. Michael R. Gordon, Serving Notice of a New U.S., Poised to Hit First and Alone,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2003, at A1.
16. FREEDMAN, supra note 7, at 25; see also COLIN S. GRAY, MAINTAINING EFFECTIVE
DETERRENCE 1 (2003) (“[E]pisodes of successful deterrence are recorded as blanks in the
pages of history books.”).
17. See, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 7, at 116 (“In all cases [deterrence] is about setting
boundaries for actions and establishing the risks associated with the crossing of those
boundaries. . . . During the cold war, this effort became focused on the superpower
confrontation, dominated by nuclear deterrence, to the point where it sucked in all theory.
The study of deterrence became synonymous with the study of the strategic conduct of the
cold war.”).
18. See, e.g., MORGAN, supra note 7, at 19 (“Retaliation against a nuclear-armed state
(or one of its allies) might set off a nuclear war and cancel the future—your society and state
could disappear. There would be no point to retaliating to prevent future attacks.”).
19. Morgan describes one influential Cold War school of thought as having concluded
that the credibility of the West’s nuclear deterrent was altogether not a concern: “A state with
massive destructive capabilities primed and ready to go could not be dismissed as bluffing,
discounted for lacking the will to retaliate, or counted on to avoid escalation, because an
attacker making a mistake on this would be committing suicide.” Id. at 24. In a similar vein,
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Those two features, however, were idiosyncratic to nuclear
deterrence. Outside the special nuclear context, a willingness and
ability to retaliate against aggression when deterrence fails is
fundamental to an effective long-term general deterrence strategy.20
Deterrence is a conditional threat—if you attack, you will be sorry—
and to be effective the threat must be both credible and daunting.21
Establishing a threat’s credibility, however, is impossible if the
threatener’s previous actions suggest that the threat is empty—for
example, if the threatener had not retaliated in the past when
deterrence failed. And, even if the threat is credible, if it does not
include the possibility of retaliation, it often will be insufficiently
daunting. Samuel Huntington notes that deterrence by defense
alone would be insufficient to provide much security: “[A]s both
logic and experience make clear, a purely denial strategy inherently is
a much weaker deterrent than one which combines both denial and
retaliation.”22

Morgan explains how nuclear weapons short-circuited another standard question in
implementing a deterrence strategy: “The key question became: how much harm would be
unacceptable? . . . [N]uclear weapons made it relatively simple to prepare a level of harm—
destroying much or all of the enemy as a viable twentieth-century society—which was
presumed to be unacceptable to any rational government.” Id. at 15.
20. Morgan has suggested that “[w]hile deterrence theory has always stressed retaliation
capabilities, for most states general deterrence means having forces for a vigorous defense; they
seldom rely on retaliation.” Id. at 87. That empirical observation, if borne out by actual data,
would raise interesting questions about why deterrence practice has diverged so much from
deterrence theory. However, Freedman has noted that empirical claims about deterrence, and
especially about general deterrence, are by nature remarkably difficult to establish. FREEDMAN,
supra note 7, at 43–47. And questions about retaliation are likely to be especially opaque to
empirical analysis, since we would expect to see retaliation occur only when the deterrer really
possessed both the capacity and the will to retaliate effectively. But in those cases, deterrence is
especially unlikely to fail. Thus, opportunities to observe actual retaliation in response to failed
deterrence are likely to be rare, leaving empirical analysts with a data set that is sparse at best.
21. Establishing the credibility of threats has been one of deterrence theory’s central
concerns. See, e.g., MORGAN, supra note 7, at 15 (“Credibility quickly became one of the two
central concerns and problems in the theory and practice of deterrence. (Stability was the
other.)”).
22. Samuel P. Huntington, Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in
Europe, 8 INT’L SECURITY 32, 37 (1984). Huntington distinguishes among three different
ways that military forces can deter. Id. at 35–36. One way is to serve as a proxy for the real
deterrent. Id. Huntington gives as an example the NATO garrison of West Berlin, a force that
had no chance of stopping any determined Warsaw Pact assault but whose presence ensured
that any such assault would risk a wider war with NATO. Id. at 36. Second, military forces may
deter by being sufficiently powerful to thwart the aggressor’s plans, “forcing the aggressor to
risk defeat in his effort or to pay additional costs for success.” Id. Finally, military forces “can
deter by threatening retaliation against assets highly valued by the potential aggressor.” Id.
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That weakness arises from deterrence’s need to convince
adversaries that the expected value of any attack would be negative
(or highly negative, if the potential adversary has low riskaversion)23—that is, from the need to affect potential adversaries’
perceptions either of the probability that an attack would fail or of
the severity of the consequences if it did fail (or both). To see why
retaliation is necessary to meet that need, we can consider the various
sorts of threats that deterrence may need to forestall.
Against raids—surprise attacks that were not intended to open a
sustained military campaign—or against assistance for terrorist
attacks, a deterrent that relied wholly on the deterrer’s ability to
mount a vigorous defense would be wholly ineffective, since the
aggressive act would be over before the defense had even managed
to begin.
Against more ambitious threats, such as invasions aimed at
territorial conquest, defensive measures would presumably have a
chance at least to come into play. But even against threats of
territorial conquest there are several significant problems for
deterrence by defense alone.
First, the adversary may be ignorant of the aspiring deterrer’s
true defense capabilities and thus may be unaware that they are
adequate to make an attack unattractive. In the real world, accurate
intelligence about adversaries’ true capabilities and intentions is
notoriously difficult to acquire.24 The possibility of retaliation,

23. See, e.g., MORGAN, supra note 7, at 44 (“[I]t is clear that the conception of
deterrence concerns an effort to prevent an attack by threatening unacceptable damage so that
in the attacker’s cost-benefit calculations the best choice is not an attack.”) (emphasis omitted).
Note that my characterization of deterrence’s task is slightly oversimplified, because under
certain circumstances a state that is contemplating aggression may be deterred even if the
expected value of the attack is not negative, provided merely that the expected value is low
enough to be less than the expected value of other available alternatives. However, since
general deterrence requires deterring a wide range of adversaries over a long period of time in
many different circumstances, and since information about the alternatives contemplated by
those adversaries and the subjective values they place upon them is very scarce under even the
best of circumstances, in practice there is no hope of being able to tailor deterrent threats so
nicely. The best that one can do is assume that everyone to be deterred will always have at least
one alternative—namely, not attacking—which has an expected value of at least zero, and then
construct one’s deterrent to ensure that attacking would have an expected value of less than
zero.
24. Defective intelligence regarding a potential opponent’s capabilities and resolve can
foster overoptimism in predicting the results of armed conflict. Geoffrey Blainey has
emphasized the role of such overoptimism as a cause of war. GEOFFREY BLAINEY, THE CAUSES
OF WAR 53 (“Why did nations turn so often to war in the belief that it was a sharp and quick

262

LEE.PP3

253

3/13/2009 9:19 AM

Preventive War

however, provides a margin of safety by increasing the potential costs
of an attack, thus mitigating the risk of an adversary’s misestimating
the deterrent to be below the threshold at which an attack would
seem attractive.
Second, in the absence of the possibility of retaliation, a potential
attacker could draw encouragement from knowing that it could
maintain some control over the cost of the attack, since that control
would both facilitate accurate estimation of that cost and provide a
safety net in case the attack went poorly.25 Samuel Huntington noted
the resulting problem for deterrence:
For a prospective attacker, the major difference between denial and
retaliation concerns the certainty and controllability of the costs he
may incur. If faced simply with a denial deterrent, he can estimate
how much effort he will have to make and what his probable losses
will be in order to defeat the enemy forces and achieve his
objective. He can then balance these costs against the gains he will
achieve. . . . If, however, he is confronted with a retaliatory
deterrent, he may well be able to secure the gains he wants with
relatively little effort, but he does not know the total costs he will
have to pay, and those costs are in large measure beyond his
control. . . . Precisely this uncertainty and absence of control made
instrument for shaping international affairs when again and again the instrument had proved to
be blunt or unpredictable? This recurring optimism is a vital prelude to war. Anything which
increases that optimism is a cause of war. Anything which dampens that optimism is a cause of
peace.”); see also id. at 35–56.
25. In addition to the uncertainty inherent in uncontrolled risks, the lack of control
itself may enhance the psychological effect of the deterrent. It is often said that people are
more fearful of risks that they feel unable to control (for example, an airplane’s crashing) than
of risks that they feel able to control (for example, an automobile’s crashing), even when the
former is statistically smaller than the latter. See, e.g., BRUCE SCHNEIER, BEYOND FEAR:
THINKING SENSIBLY ABOUT SECURITY IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 27 (2003) (“People
underestimate risks they willingly take and overestimate risks in situations they can’t control. . .
. Commercial airplanes are perceived as riskier than automobiles, because the controls are in
someone else’s hands—even though they’re much safer per passenger mile.”); CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 72 (2002) (“People
find uncontrollable risks especially unacceptable. Automobile accidents may seem less
troublesome than airline disasters partly for this reason.”). Empirical verification of this
hypothesis seems rather thin, but one widely cited paper from 1987 does suggest some
confirmation for the link between uncontrollability and fearsomeness, at least among nonexperts. Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCIENCE 280, 283 (1987). But see Jonathan
Baron, John C. Hershey & Howard Kunreuther, Determinants of Priority for Risk Reduction:
The Role of Worry, 20 RISK ANALYSIS 413, 424 tbl.VII (2000) (finding that 21% of survey
respondents cited “Lack of personal control” as one reason for worrying about a risk factor,
but also that 25% of respondents cited lack of control as a reason for not worrying about the
risk factor).
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the threat of retaliation a strong deterrent. If these problems of
uncertainty and uncontrollability are eliminated or greatly reduced,
the effectiveness of the deterrent is seriously weakened.26

Nor is this concern purely theoretical. Lawrence Freedman offers
an example from recent history:
[Deterrence through denial during the cold war] was really about
boosting conventional defenses on NATO’s central front so that
Warsaw Pact armies could not penetrate into Western Europe even
if they wanted to. Despite the obvious merits of such an
approach, . . . it was always undermined by the cost that was
expected to be involved in building NATO’s forces up to Warsaw
Pact levels, and also because, while denial was more credible, it was
not necessarily so hazardous for the Warsaw Pact. It might be
tempted to probe and push its luck knowing that the worst that
could happen was that it would not make much progress.27

Third, even if the adversary accurately recognizes the capability
of the deterrer’s defenses, the adversary may not be very risk-averse.
Indeed, risk-loving “adventurers” are precisely the sort of
troublemaking national leaders that may be most important to deter,
since even a successful defense comes at a significant cost in lives and
wealth. For deterrence to be successful against a risk-tolerant
adversary, a deterrer may need to increase, in the eyes of the
potential aggressor, the cost of an attack beyond the estimated cost
of overcoming the defender’s defenses. That, again, is the role of
retaliation.
Finally, just as the adversary’s ignorance poses problems for
deterrence by defense alone, so too can the deterrer’s ignorance be a
problem. Because accurate intelligence is often scarce, nations
seeking to deter aggressors may have difficulty assessing or even
identifying potential adversaries. Thus, it may be impossible for a
deterrer to know ex ante what amount of defense would be sufficient
to deter. The solution to this problem is to leave open the door to ex
post adjustment—that is, to retaliation, which can fill the deterrent
gap. Deterrence by defense alone is relatively brittle, vulnerable to
dramatic failures if the deterrer’s intelligence is inadequate.
Deterrence that includes the possibility of retaliation is more resilient
because it is more flexible, and thus relatively more reliable.
26. Huntington, supra note 22, at 37–38.
27. FREEDMAN, supra note 7, at 37–38.
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In sum, since effective deterrence requires that the defender’s
total deterrent response be large enough to make a potential
attacker’s net expected gain from an attack be negative (or highly
negative, if the adversary is not risk-averse), building up defenses will
often not be sufficient unless those defensive measures are backed up
by the threat of retaliation.
E. Retrospective Disproportionality
Although the importance of retaliation for an effective system of
general deterrence is widely noted, less commonly appreciated is the
extent to which this retaliation must be disproportionate to the
attack that provoked the retaliation—that is, it must be retrospectively
disproportionate. There are at least three reasons why this must be so.
First, and most generally, the need for retrospectively
disproportionate retaliation follows directly from deterrence’s central
task, namely establishing or preserving the credibility of a threat that
is sufficiently grave to dissuade future aggression. In order for such
dissuasion to occur, the threat must be scaled to negate the
advantage that the potential attacker would hope to gain by
attacking, not merely be proportioned to the magnitude of the
attack itself.28 The threatened retaliation would thus be prospectively
proportionate but retrospectively disproportionate.29
An example might be helpful. Suppose that A would benefit
greatly if a military coup overthrows the government of B, and that
A estimates that a surprise air attack that destroyed two of B’s
military bases near the border between A and B would have a fifty
percent chance of sparking such a coup. For simplicity’s sake,
suppose that A is almost certain that it could successfully conduct
such a surprise attack without significant losses of aircraft or pilots
during the attack. What would deter A from launching the attack?
28. Cf. Robert Jervis, War and Misperception, 18 J. INTERDISC. HIST. 675, 678 (1988)
(“A state may believe that the chances of victory are small and yet rationally decide to fight if
the gains of victory are large and the costs of losing are not much greater than those of making
the concessions necessary to avoid war.”).
29. See, for example, Freedman’s account of strategic deterrence: “B should be
convinced that any aggressive moves will fail to prosper either because of A’s likely resistance
or, even if they do prosper, because of retaliatory moves by A which will hurt B badly and far
outweigh any prospective gains.” FREEDMAN, supra note 7, at 27; see also Philip A. Seymour,
The Legitimacy of Peacetime Reprisal as a Tool Against State-Sponsored Terrorism, 39 NAVAL L.
REV. 221, 238 (1990) (“The extent of the original injury has little bearing on the amount of
force necessary to coerce an offending state to refrain from further acts of aggression.”).
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Since we have stipulated that the probability that the attack
would successfully prompt a coup (50%) is identical to the
probability that it would fail to do so (50%), the expected value of
the attack would depend wholly upon the size of the potential gain if
the attack succeeds and the size of the potential cost if the attack
fails. Since A would benefit greatly from a coup, if B’s retaliation is
limited to matching the size of A’s attack—in this case destroying
two military bases—A may feel that because the potential gains from
the attack are so great, the risk (or even certainty) of B’s retaliating is
worth accepting. (The potential gains from the attack are much
greater than the potential costs.) A therefore would not be deterred,
and would launch its attack. In this case, the attack would have a
negative expected value from A’s point of view only if B’s expected
retaliation would not be limited to destroying two military bases, but
rather would be considerably greater—that is, only if the retaliation
was proportioned to the size of A’s hoped-for benefit rather than to
the size of the attack itself.
A second reason why deterrence, as a general strategy, requires
retrospectively disproportionate retaliation is the need to be able to
deter aggression by any one of many possible adversaries. If a state
adopts deterrence as a general defensive strategy, its retaliation
against aggressive acts will need to be sufficient to deter not only
future attacks from that same adversary but also from other potential
adversaries, including adversaries who may be currently unknown.30
30. See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, PREEMPTION: A KNIFE THAT CUTS BOTH WAYS
10 (2006) (“The classic theory of deterrence contemplates the state’s absorbing the first harm,
apprehending its perpetrator, and then punishing him publicly and proportionally, so as to
show potential future harmdoers that it does not pay to commit the harm.”). Note the
inherent tension in Dershowitz’s remark: If by “proportionally” he means “retrospectively
proportionally,” as is traditional in law-of-war contexts, then the retaliation may well be
inadequate to “show potential future harmdoers that it does not pay to commit the harm.”
Only retaliation that is prospectively proportionate to potential adversaries’ hoped-for net future
gains would be sufficient. See also FREEDMAN, supra note 7, at 48 (“A may threaten B with
retaliation if C is attacked. . . . With luck, D, E, and F have also been impressed and will adjust
their expectations accordingly in their future dealings with both A and B.”); id. at 60–61
(discussing third-party deterrence in analogous criminological contexts); GRAY, supra note 16,
at 1 (“[D]eterrence may work most efficaciously when it can rely not upon the potency of
explicit threats, but rather upon the fears of publicly undesignated deterees who are
discouraged from taking action by their anticipation of the threats [sic] that adventurous
behavior would bring down upon their heads.”). But see MORGAN, supra note 7, at 102 (“We
lack compelling evidence that commitments are interdependent in this way. Case studies and
statistical analyses find little evidence that states assess each other’s resolve on the basis of past
actions vis-à-vis third parties, and only modest evidence that past actions vis-à-vis themselves
shape images of others’ credibility. A deterrer’s reputation certainly is important, it’s just that
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This is especially true if any of those other adversaries, or any alliance
of them, is more powerful than the original attacker and thus might
not be impressed if the deterrer demonstrates merely the will and
ability to retaliate against lesser powers. The deterrer may therefore
have to hit the original attacker harder in retaliation, not because of
any act or characteristic of that particular attacker, but because of a
threatening feature of unrelated third parties. The retaliation thus
would necessarily be disproportionate to what the initial
provocation, taken alone, would justify. It would be proportioned
instead to the size of the feared future threat.
Third, if we relax the assumption of rationality in a potential
aggressor, the need for retrospectively disproportionate retaliation
may be even greater. Insofar as deterrence is even possible against
agents with limited rationality, the deterrent threats involved would
presumably have to be especially large and credible to cut through
the fog of irrationality that governed the potential aggressor’s
decisions.31
The amount of disproportionality involved in efforts to make
deterrence effective may be quite large. Indeed, some of deterrence’s
advocates unapologetically embrace even highly retrospectively
disproportionate retaliation.
For example, Bart Szewczyk argues that preventive war is
unnecessary because the prospect of existentially disproportionate
retaliation can deter even rogue states from providing weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) to terrorists: “It is unlikely that future
rogue states would engage in such a risky policy, which could
jeopardize the existence of the state itself—or at least its

(a) past actions don’t always shape it, (b) there is no consistently reliable source of reputation,
and (c) reputation is not always crucial or even important. This makes it hard to use analysis of
the credibility problem to design an effective deterrence or explain reliably what happens when
one tries to deter.”). However, although empirical evidence on this matter would be highly
useful, a lack of such evidence either for or against propositions about third-party deterrence
tells us little, since such evidence, naturally hard to come by even for the easiest cases of
deterrence, is likely to be even thinner for the inherently diffuse workings of third-party
deterrence.
31. A situation in which the party to be deterred is partially or wholly irrational has
structural similarities to a situation in which the deterring party cannot obtain adequate
information about how the other party’s rational deliberations work. Morgan notes that during
the Cold War, the latter situation led to the development of the ultimate in disproportionate
deterrence—the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD): “MAD was not based on a
calibration of unacceptable damage. It was designed to cope with the inability of the US to
know what it would actually take to deter.” MORGAN, supra note 7, at 30.
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government.”32 Ian Shapiro echoes that sentiment in asserting that
containment through deterrence is a sufficient response to Iran’s
current nuclear ambitions:
[Iran’s] tactics scarcely distinguish them from the Soviets, against
whom containment was successfully practiced. In any case, Iran is
no better positioned than was Iraq to deploy nuclear weapons for
anything other than defensive purposes. Even in that case it would
have to be a tactic of absolute last resort, since provoking a nuclear
response from Israel or the United States would for all practical
purposes leave them without a country.33

Similarly, in the wake of 9/11, The New York Times editorialized
against hasty abandonment of deterrence, which the Times described
as “diplomatic parlance for a brutally simple idea: that an attack on
the United States or one of its close allies will lead to a devastating
military retaliation against the country responsible.”34 Indeed, the
Times found this inherent disproportionality to be one of
deterrence’s key attractions:
One advantage of deterrence is that it induces responsible behavior
by enemies as a matter of their own self-interest. Even dictators
tend to put certain basic interests above all else—pre-eminently
their survival in power, with their national territories and a
functioning economy intact. Aggression becomes unattractive if the
price is devastation at home and possible removal from power.35

And during the presidential campaign of 2000, the pre-9/11
incarnation of Condoleezza Rice—then foreign policy advisor to

32. Bart M.J. Szewczyk, Pre-emption, Deterrence, and Self-Defence: A Legal and
Historical Assessment, 18 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L AFF. 119, 133–34 (2005).
33. SHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 67; see also id. at 68 (“An obvious reason for [Iran’s and
Saddam Hussein’s] reluctance to sponsor terrorist attacks [against the United States] is the low
probability of remaining undiscovered—subjecting the sponsoring regime to the same
devastating retaliation as if they had mounted the attack themselves.”). This embrace of
“devastating retaliation” stands in ironic contrast to Shapiro’s earlier assertion:
An additional source of containment’s moral appeal derives from its affinity with the
doctrine of just war, and particularly those parts of the doctrine that require force
used always [sic] to be proportionate to the ends sought, and war always to be the
strategy of last resort. . . . We need not delve into the doctrine’s ultimate basis, if it
has one, to note that the policies flowing from containment do not contravene just
war theory and might even be seen as embodying it.
Id. at 52.
34. Editorial, supra note 5, at 24.
35. Id.
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candidate Bush—said that “the first line of defense [against rogue
states] should be a clear and classical statement of deterrence—if they
do acquire WMD, their weapons will be unusable because any
attempt to use them will bring national obliteration.”36
F. Implications of Retrospective Disproportionality
This inherent reliance upon retrospectively disproportionate
retaliation raises significant questions about the legal and moral
superiority of general deterrence strategies over strategies that
potentially involve recourse to preventive war, and similar questions
about deterrence-based strategies such as containment and power
balancing. Later Parts of this Article will examine important details of
those questions, but we can now sketch the basic concern that
retrospectively disproportionate retaliation raises, especially in the
extreme forms advocated for dealing with rogue states.
The fundamental problem is that retrospective proportionality is
commonly considered a necessary condition for a use of force to be
legitimate. For example, Michael Walzer, echoing traditional “just
war” requirements, explicitly includes retrospective proportionality
among the three conditions necessary for deterrent retaliation (which
he terms “peacetime reprisal”) to be morally permissible. Such
reprisals, he says, “are [morally] governed, after the rule of
noncombatant immunity, by the rule of backward-looking
proportionality. Though life cannot be balanced against life, the
second raid must be similar in character and scope to the first.”37
And one might think of categorical prohibitions of preventive war as
merely specific instances of a general rule requiring retrospective
proportionality: Since there was no initial provocation to which
preventive war responds, the retrospectively proportionate use of
force in such cases would be zero use of force.38

36. Condoleezza Rice, Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest, FOREIGN AFF.,
Jan.–Feb. 2000, at 45, 61.
37. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 218 (4th ed. 2006). Walzer takes himself to be establishing a
moral framework within which peacetime reprisals may occur, but in light of the inherent role
that retrospectively disproportionate retaliation plays in deterrence as a systematic security
strategy, his proportionality requirements call into question the legitimacy of any such system.
Walzer unfortunately provides no argument to explain why these particular requirements are
either necessary or jointly sufficient to make deterrent retaliation permissible.
38. Parts III and IV discuss the proportionality requirement in greater depth.
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The more extreme forms of deterrent retaliation mentioned
earlier raise the proportionality problem in especially stark fashion.
Whether such retaliation could ever be morally justifiable is a
question beyond the scope of this Article, and a question already
discussed at length in Cold War debates about nuclear retaliation. It
is worth noting, however, that the justifiability of such retaliation is
at least not obvious. Moreover, risking the occurrence of a situation
that would require a massively lethal retaliatory response may not be
obviously superior to launching a far smaller and less deadly
preventive attack to stop the situation from arising in the first place.39
More important for present purposes, however, is to note that the
proportionality concern is not limited to these spectacular instances
of massive, possibly nuclear, retaliation. Although the examples are
less dramatic when one steps back from Cold War-style deterrent
situations to situations involving lesser levels of retaliation, the basic
proportionality concern remains.
G. Permitting the Threat, Prohibiting the Act?
One cannot sidestep this difficulty by asserting that general
deterrence never requires actually engaging in retrospectively
disproportionate retaliation, but only threatening to do so. That
evasion might have been possible in the context of Cold War nuclear
deterrence, where any failure of deterrence would have eliminated
the failed deterrer, and thus made moot any questions of deterring
future adversaries. But that was a special case. More generally, if
deterrence is to be an element of a lasting security strategy (such as
containment) or global security system (such as a balance of power),
39. Using deterrence through threats of massive retaliation to stop WMD threats may
seem intuitive to strategists conditioned by the “Mutual Assured Destruction” (MAD)
framework of the Cold War to think of delivering apocalyptic responses—or at least
threatening to deliver apocalyptic responses—as the normal way of dealing with WMD threats.
But even if such an approach made moral sense during the Cold War, the reason that it did was
because there seemed to be no available alternative other than simple capitulation. Today,
however, now that MAD is no longer the dominant context for strategic choices, there is at
least one alternative—preventive war. Thus, there is a genuine question about the legal and
moral propriety of embracing a system that would choose to rely upon a willingness to wreak
horrific levels of destruction on innocent and often captive civilian populations when less
horrific means seem to be available. Note also that if such retaliation would not be morally or
legally permissible, that impermissibility could itself have strategic consequences by
undermining the credibility of the threat of such retaliation. And the weaker that deterrence is,
the less plausible it is as an alternative to a system that under certain circumstances permits
preventive war.
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then it will have to be effective over many cycles of aggression and
response. Maintaining that effectiveness without actual retaliation to
preserve the credibility of deterrent threats is likely to be impossible.
Moreover, if one cares about the global legal and moral
framework for the use of force, a rule that permitted states to
threaten to retaliate but prohibited them from actually following
through on those threats would confront states with a dilemma.
They could signal their adherence to the global legal and moral
order, but only at the cost of stripping their threats of the credibility
that is necessary for deterrence to be possible. Alternatively, they
could preserve their deterrence capability by separating themselves
from that global order, but only at a legal and moral cost both to
themselves and to the order that their separation had undermined.
Thus, a rule permitting only threats of retaliation, but not actual
retaliation, would effectively declare that deterrence as a systematic
strategy was simply incompatible with the law or morality, or both.
Such an attempt to make deterrence palatable would therefore
ultimately amount to a concession of its impermissibility.
H. Implications and Roadmap
It thus begins to be clear that there is no legal and moral free
ride for deterrence. Because of its inherent reliance on retrospectively
disproportionate retaliation, deterrence—and any deterrence-based
security system, such as containment or balance of power—rests on a
foundation relevantly similar to preventive war.40 This similarity is
essential, not accidental, because both approaches to security
inherently involve the present use of violent force to diminish or
eliminate merely potential threats. Both approaches require a
willingness to “punish” a state for something that it has not yet done
and may never do. And both necessarily involve retrospective
disproportionality.
So far, however, our discussion has been in general terms. The
next Parts will explore the implications of deterrence and preventive
war’s similarities in more detail by examining established legal and
40. For an especially clear acknowledgement of the similarity between deterrent
retaliation and preventive war, see Robert W. Tucker, Reprisals and Self-Defense: The
Customary Law, 66 AM. J. INT’L. L. 586, 591 (1972) (“[W]hat appears as a reprisal when
considered within the restricted context of the action in response to which the ‘retaliatory’
measure is taken, appears as self-defense—albeit, of an anticipatory nature—when considered
within the broad context of a hostile relationship between states.”).
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“just war” moral analyses of preventive war and deterrent retaliation.
Part III focuses on legal issues arising out of specifics of the United
Nations system. Part IV addresses broader “just war” arguments.
III. LEGAL STATUS UNDER THE U.N. SYSTEM
Under the United Nations (U.N.) system, a few compact
principles establish the basic law governing the use of force.
Although there is some controversy about the proper interpretation
of those principles when applied to contentious issues such as
preventive war, and although states and adjudicative bodies may not
always follow those principles’ literal requirements, among those
who do give those requirements great deference there is a general
trend toward interpretations under which both preventive war and
deterrent retaliation would be illegal.
A. Operative Treaty Law and Judicial Interpretations
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter declares that “[a]ll Members
shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations.”41
Article 1 specifies those “Purposes,” two of which are relevant
for our inquiry. The first purpose is “[t]o maintain international
peace and security, and to that end: . . . to bring about by peaceful
means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and
international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes
or situations that might lead to a breach of the peace,”42 and the
second purpose is “[t]o develop friendly relations among nations
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to
strengthen universal peace.”43
These rules have two exceptions, which I shall turn to in a
moment. But first note that if the exceptions do not apply, then
Article 2(4) would, on its face, seem to prohibit both preventive war
and deterrence as systematic strategies. The entire purpose of
preventive war is to use force to change the political decisions of the
41. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
42. Id. at art. 1, para. 1.
43. Id. at para. 2.
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attacked state, whether by limiting its capacity to take undesirable
future actions or by deposing the attacked regime altogether. And
deterrence, even setting aside the use of force involved in deterrent
retaliation, simply is the making of conditional threats to affect
political decisions. Using these threats to constrain a potential
adversary’s political independence is the very point of deterrence.44
As Patrick Morgan puts it, “The essence of deterrence is that one
party prevents another from doing something the first party does not
want by threatening to harm the other party seriously if it does. This
is the use of threats to manipulate behavior so that something
unwanted does not occur . . . .”45
The International Court of Justice (I.C.J.), in its Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, offered an interpretation of
Article 2(4) that might seem somewhat friendlier to the legality of
deterrence, at least in individual instances, than a literal reading of
Article 2(4) is:
Whether a signalled intention to use force if certain events occur is
or is not a “threat” within Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter
depends upon various factors. If the envisaged use of force is itself
unlawful, the stated readiness to use it would be a threat prohibited
under Article 2, paragraph 4. . . . The notions of “threat” and
“use” of force under Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter stand
together in the sense that if the use of force itself in a given case is
illegal—for whatever reason—the threat to use such force will
likewise be illegal.46

However, the I.C.J.’s opinion also endorsed the court’s previous
affirmation, in the Nicaragua case, that it is “well established in
44. Michael Doyle has noted that deterrence aims to affect the political independence of
foreign states only to the extent that what the foreign state might choose to do would be
illegal—i.e., what the foreign state is being deprived of the political independence to do is
something that it had no legal right to do anyway. Letter from Michael Doyle to Brian Angelo
Lee (Sept. 2007) (on file with author). However, one could say much the same about
preventive war—it aims to preempt an attack that the target country would have had no legal
right to launch.
45. MORGAN, supra note 7, at 1; see also GRAY, supra note 16, at 13 (“There is an
obvious and undeniable sense in which [a deteree’s] decision [whether or not to be deterred]
is made in a context of coercion, but still the intended deteree is at liberty to refuse to allow his
policy to be controlled by foreign menaces.”); Robert L. Jervis, The Confrontation Between
Iraq and the US: Implications for the Theory and Practice of Deterrence, 9 EUR. J. INT’L REL.
315, 320 (2003) (describing deterrence as a form of “coercion”).
46. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226, 246 (July 8).
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customary international law” that “self-defence would warrant only
measures which are proportional to the armed attack and necessary
to respond to it.”47 Thus, deterrence’s essential reliance on the
threat, and sometimes the actuality, of retrospectively
disproportionate retaliation would still bring deterrence into conflict
with Article 2(4)—if that article stood alone.
The U.N. Charter, however, includes two important exceptions
to its generally pacific provisions. First, the Charter authorizes the
U.N. Security Council to undertake collective action “to maintain or
restore international peace and security.”48 Second, Article 51 makes
a limited allowance for unilateral use of force in self-defense:
“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against
a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security.”49 The collective-action provision is not relevant to our
inquiry, but the provision about the inherent right of self-defense is
quite relevant. Indeed, interpreting the scope of Article 51’s selfdefense exception is the pivotal issue in determining the legality of
preventive war and of deterrent retaliation.
B. Elaboration in Case Law and the General Assembly
Two oft-cited U.N. General Assembly resolutions, although
nonbinding, are at least prima facie relevant to this interpretive issue.
General Assembly Resolution 2625 reiterated that “[e]very State has
the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force to violate the
existing international boundaries of another State or as a means of
solving international disputes, including territorial disputes and
problems concerning frontiers of States,” and declared that “[s]tates
have a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of
force.”50 Both preventive war and deterrent retaliation are contrary
to this resolution.
General Assembly Resolution 3314 set forth a very expansive
understanding of what constitutes the crime of “aggression.”

47. Id. at 245 (quoting Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.
14, 94 (June 27)).
48. U.N. Charter art. 39.
49. Id. at art. 51.
50. G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. Doc. A/8018 (Oct. 24, 1970).
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“Aggression” was to include, inter alia, “invasion or attack by the
armed forces of a State of the territory of another State,”51 the “use
of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State,”52
and “[a]n attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air
forces, or marine and air fleets of another State.”53 If read literally,
this very broad language would entail that even use of force in
garden-variety self-defense could sometimes constitute “aggression,”
and this language seems to prohibit both preventive war and
deterrent retaliation. But the resolution has a saving clause:
“Nothing in this Definition shall be construed as in any way
enlarging or diminishing the scope of the Charter, including its
provisions concerning cases in which the use of force is lawful.”54
Thus, in the end, Resolution 3314 provides little help in
determining the proper interpretation of the scope of Article 51,
since the resolution merely incorporates that interpretation, whatever
it may be.
A handful of I.C.J. cases offer some interpretive guidance. The
Corfu Channel Case involved a dispute over damage suffered by
British warships that struck mines in Albanian waters while legally
exercising their right to travel through straits used for international
navigation.55 The I.C.J. held Albania liable for that damage but also
concluded that Britain’s subsequent removal of the mines from those
straits illegally violated Albania’s territorial sovereignty. Although
removing the mines was remediation, and thus presumably easier to
justify legally than retaliation would have been, the court still
rejected its legality:
The United Kingdom Agent, in his speech in reply, has further
classified “Operation Retail” among methods of self-protection or
self-help. The Court cannot accept this defence either. Between
independent States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential
foundation of international relations. . . . [T]o ensure respect for
international law, of which it is the organ, the Court must declare
that the action of the British Navy constituted a violation of
Albanian sovereignty.56

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

G.A. Res. 3314, Annex, art. 3(a), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974).
Id. at art. 3(b).
Id. at art. 3(d).
Id. at art. 6.
The Corfu Channel Case, (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).
Id. at 35.

275

LEE.PP3

3/13/2009 9:19 AM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2009

In the Nicaragua case, the I.C.J. addressed the legality of the
United States’ support for armed Nicaraguan rebels.57 The court
explicitly set aside the question of the legality of preemptive strikes in
anticipation of imminent attacks,58 but stated that “the exercise of
[the right of individual self-defence] is subject to the State concerned
having been the victim of an armed attack.”59 The court further
asserted the illegality of using coercion to affect a state’s foreign
policy:
A prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing on
matters in which each State is permitted, by the principle of State
sovereignty, to decide freely. One of these is the choice of a
political, economic, social and cultural system, and the formulation
of foreign policy. Intervention is wrongful when it uses methods of
coercion in regard to such choices, which must remain free ones.
The element of coercion, which defines, and indeed forms the very
essence of, prohibited intervention, is particularly obvious in the
case of an intervention which uses force . . . .60

Taken alone, this condemnation would seem to imply the
illegality of both preventive war and deterrent retaliation.61 However,
the I.C.J. took some pains to state that Article 51’s exception for the
“inherent” right of self-defense indicates that the Charter does not
wholly supersede customary international law, and thus that certain
actions permissible under customary law may still be permissible
under the Charter.62 Even if this controversial claim is accepted as
true, the Nicaragua court’s affirmation of the proportionality
requirement implies that retrospectively disproportionate deterrent
retaliation, not to mention preventive war, would be illegal.
C. Academic Interpretations
Yoram Dinstein asserts that deterrent retaliation—“armed
reprisals” in his terminology—“can be a permissible form of selfdefence (in response to armed attack) under Article 51” but

57. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
58. Id. at 103.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 108.
61. The court also cited General Assembly Resolution 2625’s condemnation of reprisals.
Id. at 101.
62. Id. at 94.
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concedes that “most writers” disagree.63 Dinstein’s argument is
largely consequentialist, reasoning that since a full-blown war of selfdefense is permissible under Article 51, a fortiori the lesser use of
force involved in reprisal ought also to be permissible:
It would be incomprehensible for war to be acknowledged—as it
is—as a legitimate form of self-defense in response to an isolated
armed attack, if defensive armed reprisals were inadmissible. Taking
into account that Article 51 allows maximal use of counter-force
(war) in self-defence, there is every reason for a more calibrated
form of counter-force (defensive armed reprisals) to be legitimate
as well.64

This argument, however, is unconvincing since Article 51
permits the waging of defensive war only until the U.N. Security
Council has had time to act. As Dinstein himself acknowledges,
reprisals, unlike defensive wars, occur only after the original
provocation is complete, so immediate execution of the reprisal is
not of great urgency.65 A state that fights a defensive war is forced
into combat as soon as the aggressor attacks, but a state that intends
to launch an armed reprisal can afford to wait for Security Council
approval. Thus, the most plausible reading of Article 51 would seem
to be that deterrent retaliation is permissible only if the Security
Council has authorized it.
Moreover, Dinstein acknowledges the continued importance of
proportionality: “As in other circumstances in which self-defense is
invoked, defensive armed reprisals must meet the conditions of
necessity, proportionality and immediacy. Proportionality is the
quintessential factor in appraising the legitimacy of the countermeasures executed by the responding State.”66 Although at one
point Dinstein suggests a potentially permissive and vague definition
of “proportional” as equivalent to “reasonable,”67 he later
acknowledges that retrospective proportionality is what is required:
“[T]he responding State must adapt the magnitude of its counter63. YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENSE 198 (3d ed. 2001).
64. Id. at 201.
65. Id. at 200 (referring to “the built-in time-lag between the original armed attack and
the response of the victim State, which is an inevitable feature in all armed reprisals”).
66. Id. at 197.
67. Id. at 184 (“It is perhaps best to consider the demand for proportionality in the
province of self-defense as a standard of reasonableness in the response to force by counterforce.”).
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measures to the ‘scale and effects’ of the armed attack. A calculus of
force, introducing some symmetry or approximation between the
dimensions of the lawful counter-force and the original (unlawful)
use of force, is imperative.”68
Thus, given the essential dependence of deterrence on
retrospectively disproportionate retaliation, Dinstein’s defense of the
legality of armed reprisals under Article 51 becomes untenable. The
only permissible reprisals under his reading would be retrospectively
proportionate reprisals, that is, reprisals of a sort that would be
ineffective in maintaining general deterrence.
Mary Ellen O’Connell asserts, on the basis of General Assembly
Resolution 2625 and Corfu Channel, that use of force for “general
deterrence” is legally prohibited unless authorized by the U.N.
Security Council.69 She also asserts that preventive war “is clearly
unlawful under international law,” since “[a]rmed action in selfdefense is permitted only against armed attack.”70
The most interesting part of O’Connell’s analysis arises when she
turns to the question of how broadly to interpret Article 51’s
exception for the “inherent” right of self-defense, and specifically
whether that exception implies that states still are permitted to
exercise the rights of self-defense that they have under customary
international law. O’Connell argues that it does not—that the proper
interpretation of the exception is quite narrow. O’Connell’s main
reason for reaching that conclusion is historical and textual:
The UN Charter was adopted for the very purpose of creating a far
wider prohibition on force than existed under treaty or custom in
1945 . . . . Even if earlier custom allowed [preventive] self-defense,
arguing that it persisted after 1945 for UN members requires
privileging the word “inherent” over the plain terms of Article 2(4)
and the words “armed attack” in Article 51.71

Intuitively, this conclusion seems plausible, but the argument seems
fundamentally incomplete.
First, someone might argue that the purpose of the U.N. Charter
was to create a wider prohibition on the use of aggressive force, not
68. Id. at 198.
69. Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Myth of Preemptive Self-Defense, in AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L
LAW TASK FORCE PAPERS 1, 6 (2002), http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf.
70. Id. at 2–3.
71. Id. at 13. O’Connell’s terminology differs slightly from mine. What I have been
calling “preventive,” she refers to as “preemptive.”
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to create a wider prohibition on the use of force even in self-defense,
especially when doing so would lead to less violence overall. (Recall
that the General Assembly’s broad definition of “aggression” is nonbinding and did not appear until years after ratification of the
Charter.)
O’Connell’s textual argument—that the broad understanding of
“inherent” improperly privileges part of Article 51 over the plain
terms of Article 2(4)—is no genuine objection. Since Article 51 is
explicitly an exception to Article 2(4), Article 51’s language
necessarily has priority over Article 2(4)’s. Moreover, it is not clear
why privileging the word “inherent” in Article 51 over the words
“armed attack” in that same article is any more objectionable than
what O’Connell advocates, which is to privilege “armed attack” over
“inherent.” At best, which of those two terms should take priority
seems indeterminate.
Here Dinstein’s argument for the same conclusion seems more
telling: The language of Article 51 would be quite perplexing if its
drafters had intended to allow states to continue to exercise a
customary international law right to resort to preventive war: “What
is the point in stating the obvious (i.e., that an armed attack gives
rise to the right of self-defence), while omitting a reference to the
ambiguous conditions of preventive war?”72
But another, more fundamental, response is potentially available
to defenders of a broad understanding of “inherent.” O’Connell
describes it briefly and rejects it:
Some writers promoting the “inherent right” theory argue that the
parameters of the right of self-defense are unchangeable by Charter
text and subsequent state practice. Indeed some principles of
international law are unchangeable, even by subsequent agreement
or practice. These are the so-called jus cogens principles. But no
authority has ever identified a unilateral right of anticipatory selfdefense as a jus cogens principle.73

Even if no one has acknowledged such a principle (or a similar
principle permitting retrospectively disproportionate deterrent
retaliation) it still might be possible to construct an argument that

72. DINSTEIN, supra note 63, at 168. Again, note that parallel reasoning would also rule
out retrospectively disproportionate deterrent retaliation.
73. O’Connell, supra note 69, at 13. O’Connell does not mention which writers she has
in mind.
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such a principle must exist. For example, Whitley Kaufman, in
arguing for a conclusion similar to O’Connell’s, has advanced a
contractualist argument. Kaufman suggests that establishment of the
U.N. Charter moved the world from a state of nature, where
traditional just war rules applied, to a condition of “civil society”
governed by the U.N. as sovereign, and that the “social contract”
requires states to “agree to submit disputes to a central authority and
to abide by its decisions (even when they vehemently disagree).”74
But if one takes this “social contract” notion seriously, the correct
conclusion might be the exact opposite—that states retain a broad
inherent right of self-defense no matter what language is in the
Charter.
If a social contract is what creates “civil society” at the
international level, presumably a social contract is also what creates
“civil society” at the national level. Thus, international “civil society”
would be the product of a contract among entities (states) which are
themselves the products of social contracts. So one would expect
that the authority of those component states would not be
unlimited—there are certain concessions that the individuals who
contracted to provide that authority would not have made. For
example, individuals would be unlikely to contract to create a state
with the authority to enter a treaty that sold the state’s population
into slavery. So no such treaty provisions could be binding, even if
the relevant governments observed all the formalities in creating that
“treaty”—those governments would necessarily have lacked the
authority to accept such provisions. The crucial question then
becomes whether individuals entering a social contract would have
agreed to give their states the authority to relinquish the customary
right of preventive self-defense (or of retrospectively
disproportionate deterrent retaliation) in exchange for the protection
of the U.N. as global sovereign.
The answer to that question seems to hinge on how effective
those individuals would expect the U.N. to be at enforcing peaceable
relations. And the establishment of veto-wielding permanent
members of the Security Council, not to mention all of the U.N.’s
other institutional constraints, arguably made inevitable the U.N.’s
sadly dismal record as guarantor of world peace. As a result, from a

74. Whitley Kaufman, What’s Wrong with Preventive War? The Moral and Legal Basis for
the Preventive Use of Force, ETHICS & INT’L AFF., Dec. 2005, at 32, 37.
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contractualist point of view, there is at least a prima facie plausible
argument that Article 51 cannot be read as depriving states of their
former rights of self-defense, because no state would have had the
authority to consent to such a term in a “social contract.”
Nor does this conclusion necessarily require contractualist
premises. For example, one might argue that a “civil society” of the
sort that Kaufman describes is something that those who drafted the
Charter did indeed attempt to create, but that their attempt failed:
The U.N. never actually became a global sovereign. As recent events
abroad remind us, creating a genuine civil society requires
considerably more than drafting a constitution and declaring success.
Alternatively, one may argue that the right to defend oneself as
effectively as possible against mortal threats is an inalienable “natural
right,”75 or that states have a natural law duty to protect their citizens
and thus necessarily lack the authority to cede the rights of selfdefense necessary to fulfill that duty.76
Of course, such arguments involve complex and profound issues,
and assessing their merits is far beyond the scope of this Article. For
present purposes, it is enough to note their possibility and three
consequences of our discussion: First, the legal statuses of deterrent
retaliation and of preventive war are likely to be similar. Second,
what those statuses are will depend upon the proper interpretation of
the scope of Article 51. And, third, simple textual or historical
analysis may not be enough to determine the legal permissibility of
deterrence and preventive war.
IV. CONTEMPORARY “JUST WAR” ARGUMENTS
Our discussion so far has focused on the U.N. Charter system.
Different questions arise when we consider more general debates
about the requirements of “just war” theory.

75. This sort of idea may lie behind Burton Leiser’s argument that “[c]onditions being
what they are, there can be no blanket moral or legal condemnation of reprisals. Some reprisals
must be permissible, for without the right to resort to them, peace-loving nations would be at
the mercy of those who are more inclined to engage in international outlawry.” Burton M.
Leiser, The Morality of Reprisals, 85 ETHICS 159, 163 (1975).
76. For the notion of a state’s natural law duty to protect its citizens, see, e.g., William
C. Bradford, “The Duty to Defend Them”: A Natural Law Justification for the Bush Doctrine of
Preventive War, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1365, 1426–36, 1450–53 (2004).
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A. Non-Consequentialist Arguments
Traditional just war criteria, which are often (although not
necessarily) taken to be non-consequentialist principles, pose serious
difficulties for preventive war. We have already seen the formidable
difficulty that the traditional just war requirement of retrospective
proportionality poses for deterrence and, a fortiori, for preventive
war. But an equally grave problem arises from the criterion
designating who may legitimately be subject to attack. As Jeff
McMahan notes, “Because in just war theory the criterion of liability
to attack is actively posing a threat to others, it is simply not possible
for that theory to acknowledge the permissibility of any instance of
preventive war.”77 Note that this same criterion would also rule out
general deterrent retaliation in most instances (since the attack to be
deterred would not yet be in the offing) and always to the extent
that the retaliation is intended to deter third parties. Thus, general
deterrence would be an impermissible security strategy.
The implications of non-consequentialist jus in bello precepts
about legitimate targets reinforce this conclusion. It is common to
take jus in bello principles, principles about how to fight the wars that
occur, to be conceptually and practically distinct from jus ad bellum
principles, principles about when it is permissible to go to war in the
first place. However, in the case of deterrent retaliation, those
categories blur together.
Michael Walzer has advanced a rights-based jus in bello criticism
of belligerent reprisals (reprisals within an already existing war) when
directed against civilians, prisoners of war, and other innocents—for
example, against responding to an adversary’s massacre of prisoners
of war by killing an equal number of the adversary’s soldiers who are
now prisoners. Such belligerent reprisals, Walzer asserts, violate the
rights of their innocent victims: “[T]he helplessness of the victims
rules them out as objects of military attack, and their
noninvolvement in criminal activity rules them out as objects of
retributive violence.”78 David Rodin concurs, “[T]he innocent
victims of reprisal have not violated anyone’s rights, and therefore
retain full rights against being harmed for the purposes of
deterrence. Reprisal is a case of punishing the innocent to deter the

77. McMahan, supra note 13, at 179.
78. WALZER, supra note 37, at 213–14.
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guilty. As such, it is reciprocal action directed at the wrong subjects
. . . .”79
Although introduced in a jus in bello context, such rights-based
arguments naturally imply a straightforward jus ad bellum rejection
both of what Walzer calls “peacetime reprisal”—that is, deterrent
retaliation—and of preventive war.80 That conclusion is fairly obvious
in cases of third-party deterrence—for example, cases in which B
attacks A and then A amplifies its retaliation with an eye toward
deterring not only B but also C and D. Because the residents of B
who experience the resulting extra suffering bear no responsibility for
what C or D may do, their rights are violated in being forced to pay
the price nonetheless.
Even if there are only two actors, A and B, if A’s launching a
preventive attack against B to forestall something that B has not yet
done would violate the rights of B’s residents, then A’s increasing its
level of retaliation against B to deter attacks that B has not yet
launched would seem to violate those residents’ rights just as much.
To be sure, prior acts can forfeit rights, so B’s initial attack may
forfeit its residents’ right to be immune from some violent response,
but that is far from entailing that B’s residents have forfeited all
immunity from any sort of attack—just as a criminal’s crime forfeits
his right not to be imprisoned but does not make him morally liable
for punishment for crimes that he has not yet committed. Absent
such a restriction, any (non-consequentialist) retrospective proportionality requirement would be a dead letter.
So these standard rights-based accounts do not provide grounds
for morally distinguishing preventive war from deterrent retaliation;
the impermissibility of the one closely tracks the impermissibility of
the other.
B. Consequentialist Arguments—General Observations
Consequentialist arguments provide a stronger prima facie case
for the permissibility of deterrent retaliation, but also for the
permissibility of preventive war. A basic outline for an argument of
this sort is easy to sketch: Since the violence and destructiveness of
war are bad, states should, all else being equal, at least be allowed
79. David Rodin, The Ethics of Asymmetric War, in THE ETHICS OF WAR: SHARED
PROBLEMS IN DIFFERENT TRADITIONS 153, 163 (Richard Sorabji & David Rodin eds., 2006).
80. WALZER, supra note 37, at 216–22.
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(and perhaps even required) to take measures that lead to a smaller
total amount of such violence and destructiveness. And since
sometimes relatively small preventive actions or deterrent retaliation
can forestall much larger and more destructive wars, states should
therefore sometimes be allowed to engage in those actions of
retaliation, if the total net consequences would be positive.81
Of course, that sketch is much too simple, and any full
development of a consequentialist argument in favor of either
preventive war or deterrent retaliation would require considerable
elaboration. However, the sketch is a sufficient backdrop for
examining the current consequentialist literature, which typically has
been skeptical of preventive war and thus has focused on arguing
against its permissibility rather than for it. We shall once again see
that the concerns raised about preventive war commonly apply with
equal force to deterrent retaliation.
Although these consequentialist criticisms vary in their details,
they are typically variations on a common theme: Because of selfinterested human nature and the inherent limitations on human
knowledge, permitting preventive war would have negative net total
consequences by leading to the occurrence of too many wars.
C. The Psychological Argument
One consequentialist argument focuses on psychological issues.
Jeff McMahan asserts that natural human partiality irremediably
biases decisions in favor of going to war:
Americans are not alone in thinking that whatever threats they face
must be unjust, while any threats they pose must be just. For most
citizens of most countries cherish the same patriotic delusions
about their own country. And this means that, even if we could
identify a plausible doctrine of preventive war that would specify
the precise conditions in which such a war could be justified, the
doctrine would be bound to be regularly misapplied.82

Similarly, David Luban reworks Michael Walzer’s nonconsequentialist concern about making war too “ordinary” into a
consequentialist concern about lowering psychic barriers to engaging
in preventive war: Permitting preventive war would make war part of
81. For one version of a consequentialist argument in favor of preventive war see Luban,
supra note 8, at 220–21.
82. McMahan, supra note 13, at 175.
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politics as usual, by establishing that the trigger for war need not be
a truly exceptional imminent threat—“the adversary’s unmistakable
signal that it has crossed the line from diplomacy to force”—but
rather only a “set of policy choices not much different in kind from
those that states always make.”83 We therefore must ban preventive
war because “it looks too much like aggressive war, and experience
has taught that routinizing aggression costs too much blood and too
much suffering.”84
Luban’s argument that permitting preventive war would make
war too ordinary might seem to establish a clear distinction between
deterrent retaliation and preventive war, since deterrent retaliation
requires at least a prior attack against which to retaliate. Thus there is
a natural limitation on deterrent retaliation’s ordinariness, provided
that the overall deterrence system is working well enough that
provocative attacks are not themselves commonplace.
However, there is an important respect in which deterrence’s
essential dependence on deterrent retaliation makes state violence
even more ordinary than a doctrine of preventive war does.
Preventive war doctrines say only that launching a preventive war is
permitted under certain circumstances in which future threats exist.
Even when those circumstances arise, it is quite consistent with that
doctrine for a state to choose not to launch a preventive attack, for
any of a multitude of reasons. Deterrence theory, by contrast,
requires deterrent retaliation in response to attacks when a future
threat exists—otherwise the deterrence system breaks down. Thus
deterrence theory makes the use of force a normal part of policy in a
way that goes significantly beyond even the doctrine of preventive
war.
D. The Epistemic Argument
A related concern is epistemic: Under the best of circumstances it
is difficult to know what other parties may do in the future, and
often it may be wholly impossible. Thus, when a state contemplates
launching a preventive war, even if it sincerely believes that such a
83. Luban, supra note 8, at 224–25; see also WALZER, supra note 37, at 79 (asserting
that consequentialist criteria for what constitutes a legitimately actionable threat are inadequate
“not because the wars they generate are too frequent, but because they are too common in
another sense: too ordinary. . . . They radically underestimate the importance of the shift from
diplomacy to force.”).
84. Luban, supra note 8, at 225.
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war would have a net positive result overall, it is quite possibly
wrong. Michael Walzer finds in this sort of concern a reason to reject
consequentialist analysis altogether: “Given the radical uncertainties
of power politics, there probably is no practical way of making out
that position—deciding when to fight and when not—on utilitarian
principles.”85
But even some consequentialists who would reject Walzer’s
conclusion as too extreme nevertheless find this epistemic limitation
to be compelling enough to require a prohibition on preventive war.
Jeff McMahan concludes that “the fundamental objection to
preventive defence and, by implication, preventive war is not that it
necessarily targets the innocent, but that, in practice, matters of
evidence and probability are virtually never such that the effort at
justification can succeed.”86 Similarly, David Luban argues that
allowing preventive war brings into play human judgment and its
irrationalities. Even when acting in good faith, decision makers
cannot adequately gauge the size of an unactualized threat, so riskaversion will lead those decision makers to launch too many wars.87
The end result, critics agree, is that granting moral permissibility to
preventive war would increase the frequency of wars and induce
global instability.
These underlying observations about human psychological and
epistemic limitations clearly have some merit. As anyone who has
observed the history of stock market speculation can attest,
predicting the behavior of other agents in a competitive environment
is extremely difficult even under very favorable conditions. Accurate
prediction becomes only more difficult when we switch to
international relations, and the stakes become incomparably higher.
However, those very same limitations would affect decisions about
deterrent retaliation as much as they affect decisions about preventive
war. Citizens of country A are likely to overestimate their innocence
in provoking B’s attack on A, and thus to overestimate the extent to
which deterrent retaliation is necessary to keep B (or C or D) from
launching a future attack. Moreover, the epistemic difficulties that A
faces in predicting the future behavior of B, C, and D are the same
whether A is making predictions for the purpose of deciding about

85. WALZER, supra note 37, at 77.
86. McMahan, supra note 13, at 185.
87. Luban, supra note 8, at 227.
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deterrent retaliation or for the purpose of deciding about preventive
war. Deterrent retaliation thus stands on epistemic ground that is no
firmer than preventive war’s.
E. The Symmetry Argument
David Luban has argued that making prevention a universal
principle available to any nation would lead to the absurd conclusion
that attacks “by both states in any of the world’s hot spots” would
be justified, as each acted to strike before it was struck. 88
However, this criticism evaporates once one notes (as Luban
does in a footnote) that a rule specifically prohibiting preventive war
would be only one of the “just war” limitations on states’ ability to
use force in preventive attacks.89 Traditional jus ad bellum criteria still
apply, including the requirement of necessity.90 Thus, even if
preventive wars were not generically prohibited, adversary states in
the world’s hot spots would still not be morally entitled to launch
preventive attacks against their opponents unless those opponents
were (or genuinely seemed to be) preparing an aggressive attack and
unless preventive war was the only possible way to mitigate that
threat effectively. If B’s justification for attacking A is that B needs to
prevent an attack from A, and A’s reason for considering attacking B
is because A in turn feels compelled to prevent an attack which it
anticipates from B, then the appropriate thing for B to do is not to
attack A, but rather to reassure A of B’s peaceful intentions.
Preventive attack by B would be unnecessary and thus unjustified.91
Thus, contrary to Luban, removing the prohibition against
preventive war would not necessarily give Japan moral permission to
attack North Korea preventively, nor give North Korea moral
permission to attack Japan.92

88. Id.
89. Id. at n.35.
90. Although historically there have been non-consequentialist arguments for the
existence of those criteria, consequentialist arguments to the same conclusion are also available.
91. Of course, such reassurances may fail, but then A’s attack would be tragically
unjustified (because it is unnecessary), and if A’s ignorance or irrationality was propelling A
toward attacking B despite B’s best efforts to defuse the situation, it is not obvious that justice
or morality would always require that B refrain from protecting its population by anticipating
A’s attack.
92. Luban’s Japan-North Korea example appears in Luban, supra note 8, at 227. His
acknowledgment of the possible relevance of other moral rules appears in id. at 227 n.35.
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F. The Self-Fulfilling Prophesy Argument
Luban further argues that the doctrine of preventive war makes
rival states become potential threats to each other (and thus creates
genuine reasons for preventive attacks), because it permits each rival
to attack another “based on risk calculations whose indeterminacy
makes them inherently unpredictable by the adversary—and then it
licenses attacks by both of them, because now they are potential
threats to each other.”93 The idea is that permitting preventive wars
would actually induce states to launch preventive wars, as each
reciprocally anticipated an anticipatory attack by the other.
However, just as in the symmetry argument, the continued
applicability of the jus ad bellum requirement of necessity shortcircuits this problem. A blanket just war prohibition of preventive
war will discourage states from creating such threats only to the
extent that state behavior actually complies with just war restrictions,
and if states do comply with those restrictions, then they will also
comply with the necessity condition. Thus, rather than plan for a
preventive attack to forestall their neighbor’s preventive attack, they
will work to convince the neighbor of their peaceful intentions,
either through unilateral actions or through formal agreements such
as non-aggression treaties.
Moreover, deterrence is little better than preventive war in this
regard, since deterrent retaliation would be open to a similar
criticism: Permitting retrospectively disproportionate deterrent
retaliation might lead to cycles of escalating violence, as each party
sought to deter the other from engaging in such retaliation in the
future. But again the necessity requirement acts as a limiter: There
would be no necessity for the party that launched the first attack to
retaliate in order to avoid receiving deterrent retaliation in the
future, since it could avoid future retaliation simply by refraining
from launching aggressive attacks.
Nor does instability provide a convincing ground for
distinguishing between deterrent retaliation and preventive war, for
at least two reasons. First, deterrent retaliation can itself be
destabilizing, since, if unsuccessful in deterring the recipient of the
retaliation, it could trigger counter-retaliation and even escalating
counter-retaliation.

93. Id. at 227.
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Second, the destabilizing effects of granting moral permission to
some instances of preventive war should not be overstated. It bears
repeating that granting moral permission to launch a given preventive
war does not imply a moral compulsion to do so. Luban asserts that
“in life-and-death games, the gap between ‘permitted’ and
‘prudentially required’ thins to the vanishing point.”94 But one must
be careful not to confuse moral and prudential reasons. Even in lifeand-death situations, the gap between morally permitted and
prudentially required is often very large indeed. For example, even if
the United States was morally permitted to lead an invasion of Iraq
in 2003, many critics would nevertheless maintain that the United
States was not prudentially required to do so—indeed that prudence
dictated the opposite. And in light of what transpired after the
invasion, the likelihood that the United States will launch more
preventive wars in the foreseeable future seems sharply diminished,
even if the United States would be morally permitted to do so. Thus,
a system which granted a limited moral permission for preventive
wars under certain circumstances would not necessarily open the
floodgates to a destabilizing sea of preventive wars. The actual effect
on global stability might be comparable to the effect of granting
moral permission for retrospectively disproportionate deterrent
retaliation. (And in each case the effect of granting or denying moral
permission might be small. One need not be a thoroughgoing
“realist” to suspect that moral rules about permissible uses of force
are not ubiquitously determinative of state action.)
Moreover, it is not certain that an increase in preventive wars
would increase long-term global instability rather than decrease it. An
increase in preventive wars would clearly increase short-term
instability, but if those wars actually were successful in thwarting
even larger threats, the net effect might actually be to decrease the
total amount of international violence. Michael Walzer noted that
historically preventive war has been tied to the maintenance of
systems of balance of power,95 and we might think of such systems as
accepting a higher frequency of small-scale instability in exchange for
a lower risk of large-scale instability. Of course, if preventive wars are
most often launched when prudentially unjustified (from the
standpoint of total welfare), then we would indeed expect greater

94. Id.
95. WALZER, supra note 37, at 76–77.
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total instability from permitting such wars. But whether such
prudentially unjustified preventive wars would be the norm is an
empirical question which armchair theorizing, by either preventive
war’s defenders or its critics, is inadequate to replace. And since
adequate empirical data seems unlikely to be available, the question
remains open.96
Thus, neither non-consequentialist nor consequentialist
arguments, even to the extent that they are persuasive, provide
grounds for finding any significant difference in the relative
permissibility of deterrent retaliation and of preventive war.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that future-orientation and reliance on
retrospectively disproportionate retaliation make general deterrence
subject to many of the same fundamental objections that are raised
against doctrines which permit preventive war. There are three
possible responses to this situation.
One might assert that deterrence clearly is permissible (both
legally and morally), and therefore preventive war must also be
permissible, at least sometimes. For someone who takes this
approach, the main challenge will then be to identify an appropriate
legal and moral framework within the current system to regulate,
without prohibiting, unilateral recourse to preventive war.
Alternatively, one might assert that preventive war is clearly
impermissible (either legally or morally or both), and therefore
retrospectively disproportionate deterrent retaliation, and thus
general deterrence, must also be impermissible.
Someone who took that approach then would have two options.
One option is to conclude that the legal or moral rules that prohibit
such use of force must therefore be incorrect and need to be
changed. Michael Walzer, for example, has concluded that the
current prohibition on preventive war needs modification and has

96. Randall Dipert asserts that computer simulations of the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
indicate that preventive war does not ultimately lead to more wars and destruction. (He also
asserts the existence of game-theoretic proofs of a similar result for deterrent retaliation.)
Randall R. Dipert, Preventive War and the Epistemological Dimension of the Morality of War, 5
J. MIL. ETHICS 32, 47–48 (2006).
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proposed “a major revision of the legalist paradigm.”97 The principal
challenge facing someone who takes this option is to set forth and
justify what those revisions ought to be.
The other option is to assert that we should take the current
legal and moral rules as essentially unchangeable, and thus that states
should refuse to use strategies involving preventive war or
deterrence, no matter how costly that refusal may be. The main
challenge for anyone who adopts this option is to identify some
practically adequate permissible substitute for the strategies that they
prohibit, strategies that form the foundation of the existing global
security system. For without a reasonable substitute, the result of this
prohibition might not be the marginalization of those disfavored
strategies but rather the marginalization of the system of rules that
prohibits them, and predation by the rule-disregarding upon the
rule-abiding.98
Which of these three responses is best is a question too large to
be settled here. What is important for our purposes is to recognize
that the question cannot be avoided. Common assumptions
notwithstanding, deterrence, and strategies such as containment that
depend on deterrence, are not legally and morally easy alternatives to
preventive war. Rather, they are all close cousins, and we must be
cautious about making a legal or moral judgment about one of
them, unless we are willing to make that same judgment about the
other.

97. WALZER, supra note 37, at 85. Walzer proposes adopting a rule along the lines of:
“[S]tates may use military force in the face of threats of war, whenever the failure to do so
would seriously risk their territorial integrity or political independence.” Id.
98. Cf. DINSTEIN, supra note 63, at 201 (“Evidently, international law is created in the
practice of States and not in scholarly writings. Even if clarity existed on the doctrinal level that
a State ‘is not entitled to exercise a right of reprisal in modern international law’, this would
merely serve ‘to discredit doctrinal approaches to legal analysis.’”) (quoting R.A. Falk, The
Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation, 63 AM. J. INT’L L. 415, 430 (1969)).
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